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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to, Utah Code Ann. §78-2A-3(2)(h)
amended; and Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
RESTATEMENT OF AND OBJECTIONS TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY
APPELLANT
A.

Should the child support have been modified pursuant to each child reaching the

age of majority.
1.

Standard of Review

Questions of law which the court reviews for correctness with out deference to the
District Court. Brinkerhoffv. Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d 113 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Ball v. Peterson,
912 P.2d 1006 (UtahCt. App. 1996).
Objections:
Appellee objects to and disagrees with both the issue above presented by the Appellant
and the standard of review under which the Court should consider the issue. Appellee sets forth
this position in the argument section of this brief below.
B.

Did the trial court act correctly allowing evidence of an alleged agreement when

there were no pleadings filed by the Petitioner alleging any affirmative defenses as required
pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
1.

Standard of Review

Correction of error standard. Question of law which the court reviews without deference
to the District Court. State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738 (Ut. 1997).

Objections:
Appellee objects to and disagrees with both the issue above presented by the Appellant
and the standard of review under which the Court should consider the issue. Appellee sets forth
this position in the argument section of this brief below.
C.

Should the court have awarded the respondent the child for all tax purposes.
1.

Standard of Review

Abuse of Discretion. Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992). Failure to make
findings, is itself an abuse of discretion. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988).
Objections:
Appellee objects to the above issue as one that was not properly before the trial court and
thus incapable of an abuse of discretion. Appelle sets forth the basis for this position in the
argument section of this brief below.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
A.

Constitutional Provisions
There are no Constitutional provisions that would be or are applicable in this matter.

B.

Statutes

Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7,10 provides as follows:
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has graduated from high school during the
child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later, the base child support
award is automatically adjusted to reflect the base combined child support obligation shown in the
table for the remaining number of children due child support, unless otherwise provided in the
child support order.
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(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child amount derivedfromthe base child
support award originally ordered.
(3) If the incomes of the parties are not specified in the last order or the worksheets, the
information regarding the incomes is not consistent, or the order deviatesfromthe guidelines,
automatic adjustment of the order does not apply and the order will continue until modified by the
issuing tribunal. If the order is deviated and the parties subsequently obtain a judicial order that
adjusts the support back to the date of the emancipation of the child, the Office of Recovery
Services may not be required to repay any differences in the support collected during the interim.
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.21 provides:
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the right to claim a child
or children as exemptions for federal and state income tax purposes. Unless the parties otherwise
stipulate in writing, the court or administrative agency shall award in anyfinalorder the
exemption on a case-by-case basis.
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall consider:
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the cost of raising the
child; and
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative agency may not award any
exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not current in his child support obligation, in
which case the court or administrative agency may award an exemption to the custodial parent.
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will result in a tax
benefit to that parent.

C.

Rules
Appellee rejects the Appellant's position that Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

applies in this matter, so she has not set forth herein any applicable rules.

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
Appellee herein sets forth relevant additional facts to supplement that which has
previously submitted by the Appellant in his brief. Appellee concedes also that the facts set forth
in the Appellant's "Relevant Facts" section of his brief are incorporated herein so far as they
speak specifically to those portions of the record that accurately reflect the same.
In supplement thereof, the Appellee states and sets forth herein the specific findings of the
Court as follows:
1.

"That paragraph 5 of the Amended Order on Stipulation dated the March 20, 1998

is ambiguous and it was necessary for the Court to receive extrinsic evidence in regard to the
intent of the parties relating to the payment of $831 per month as child support." (R738 at f 1)
2.

"At the time the Stipulation of the parties was entered on February 2, 1998 from

which the Amended Order on Stipulation was drafted, the Defendant was indebted to the Plaintiff
for child support and alimony arrears in the sum of $4,670 under the Supplemental Decree of
Divorce and an additional $2m078 in child support pursuant to other orders of the Court. Further,
the Petitioner had obtained an Order on Order to Show Cause dated the 14th of November, 1997
wherein Petitioner was awarded the $35,000 of Respondent's 401K for Respondent's failure to
comply with the Orders of the Court in regard to paying the second mortgage of $390 per month
with the issue of taxes and penalties on the 40 IK to be reserved until the money was withdrawn.
Petitioner also had additional judgments in the Order on Order to Show Cause dated the 14th of

November, 1997 for the sum of $420.47 for medical expenses, for over payment of insurance
premiums in the sum of $111.30 and $750 for attorney's fees." (R738 at f2).
3.

"The Petitioner testified that it was her understanding that the intent of the

language of paragraph 5 of the Amended Order on Stipulation was to have the monthly child
support amount of $831 per month continue on a monthly basis until the youngest child of the
parties turned 18 or her normal class graduated from high school, whichever occurs last. She was
willing to agree to the same and to waive her claims for the aforementioned arrearages and
judgments in consideration for receiving the $831 each month. Petitioner also understood that the
monthly amount $831 per month would not be decreased when two of the children turned 18 or
their normal class graduatedfromhigh school and would only terminate when the youngest child
had turned 18 or her normal class graduated from high school." (R738-739 at f3).
4.

"The Court furtherfindsthat at the time the Stipulation was entered into by and

between the parties in February of 1998 that the Respondent had not paid to the Petitioner the
monthly paymeiit of $390 on the second mortgage, as w#s ordered in the Supplemental Decree of
Divorce. The Courtfinds,based upon the foregoing, that the Petitioner's understanding in regard
to the intent of the language contained in paragraph 5 of the Amended Order on Stipulation dated
March 20,1998 is correct and that she is entitled to receive the sum of $831 per month until the
youngest child of the parties reaches 18 or her normal class graduatesfromhigh school." (R739 at
14).
5.

"The Court furtherfindsthat the Amended Order on Stipulation dated March 20,

1998 is a deviationfromthe base combined child support obligation table contained in Utah Code
§78-45-7.14 and that automatic adjustment statute contained in Utah Codes §78r45-7.10 is not
applicable to the facts of this case." (R739 at %5)
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6.

"Both parties have incurred attorneys fees and neither party's claims or position

are asserted in bad faith and, therefore, it is reasonable that both parties assume and pay their own
attorneys fees and costs incurred herein." (R739 at f6)
7.

"The Respondent did not over pay his child support obligations and, therefore, is

not entitled to any reimbursement in regard to any over payment." (R739 at f7).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A,

Under Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.10(3), "If the incomes of the parties are not

specified in the last order or the worksheets, the information regarding the incomes is not
consistent, or the order deviatesfromthe guidelines, automatic adjustment of the order does not
apply and the order will continue until modified by the issuing tribunal." The argument for the
Appellee on the first issue presented by the Appellant need not address whether child support
should have been modified pursuant to each child reaching majority because the Court did not rule
that the Order contemplated that even occurring. Instead the Appellee argues herein that the
Court was correct infindingthat f5 of the Amended Order on Stipulation (R506 at f5) was
ambiguous, needed extrinsic evidence and that it was a deviated order. As the Court has clear and
unambiguous statutory authority to rule, and did in fact rule, that child support did not
automatically reduce when each child reaches majority in this case, the Appellee argues that the
Court did not error under any provision within UCA §78-45-7.10(3) and that the record supports
such a finding.
B.

Appellant sets forth in his second presented issue that the Court erred in allowing

evidence of an agreement when there were no pleadingsfiledby the Appellee setting forth a
specific affirmative defense under Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellee argues

herein that she was not required to set forth an aflSrmative defense on this issue and the Appellant
had full knowledge of the Appellees position per his own Verified Petition for Modification of
Decree of Divorce (R594-605) and the Appellee's Answer to Verified Petition for Modification
(R623-624). The Court therefore, correctly allowed evidence on the agreement first because the
agreement need not be affirmatively defended by the Appellee and; second, because the Court
found sua sponte that f5 of the Amended Order on Stipulation (R506 at f5) was ambiguous and
needed extrinsic evidence to show intent and understanding. (R608 at pg. 38).
C.

In his third presented issue, the Appellant asks this Court to consider whether it

was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award the Petitioner the child for all tax purposes.
The Appellee, notwithstanding the Appellants argument proposed authority, sets forth that the
Court did not abuse discretion in allowing the Petitioner to take the child for tax purposes because
above all, that issue was not properly before it and it therefore had no discretion to abuse nor
findings to make.
D.

Lastly, Appellant takes issue to the trial court's failure to award attorney's fees

and believes the Respondent should be awarded his attorney's fees. Foremost, the Appellant will
argue that if anyone should be provided fees it is the Appellee as she is the party who prevailed in
the trial court and an award for attorney's fees was contemplated within the Amended Order on
Stipulation (R508 at % 12).

n

ARGUMENT
A.

NO ERROR OF LAW HAS OCCURRED ON THE ISSUE OF CHILD

SUPPORT MODIFICATION AS THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE AMENDED
ORDER ON STIPULATION WAS AMBIGUOUS AND TOOK EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
TO FIND THAT CHILD SUPPORT WAS NOT MODIFIABLE PER THE PARTIES
STIPULATION,
Appellant is essentially arguing that the Court erred by not modifying support
pursuant to Utah Code and the Johansen v. Johansen case. First, and relevant case law clearly
support the court's decision to allow parole evidence on the agreement and interpret the
stipulation between the parties. Second, Johansen v. Johansen is easily distinguishable in this
matter as that case is one regarding the "automatically adjusted" section of Utah Code §78-457.10 and the case at bar relates specifically to the Court finding an ambiguous provision within a
stipulated order, allowing testimony to clarify and finding that the order for support deviates from
the guidelines and does not therefore fall within the "automatic" provisions of the code.
Utah Code §78-45-7.10 states in whole that:
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has graduated from high school during the
child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later, the base child support
award is automatically adjusted to reflect the base combined child support obligation shown in the
table for the remaining number of children due child support, unless otherwise provided in the
child support order.
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child amount derived from the base child
support award originally ordered.

(3) If the incomes of the parties are not specified in the last order or the worksheets, the
information regarding the incomes is not consistent, or the order deviates from the guidelines,
automatic adjustment of the order does not apply and the order will continue until modified by the
issuing tribunal. If the order is deviated and the parties subsequently obtain a judicial order that
adjusts the support back to the date of the emancipation of the child, the Office of Recovery
Services may not be required to repay any differences in the support collected during the interim.
As stated above, this issue is not about erring in the application of this provision. Instead,
the Court found sua sponte that %5 of the Amended Order on Stipulation was ambiguous as it
related to the Appellee's testimony (R807 at 36-37) regarding when child support would
terminate or how long it would continue. The Court states in referring to f5, "At this point, as I
read this thing, I think it's ambiguous." (R807 at 38) The Court further found that it could receive
extrinsic evidence to determine what is the meaning of the language. (R807 at pgs. 38 and 99100) The Court was accurate in its position. Since the Court was considering language in an
Order that came pursuant to a Stipulation (R422), "a stipulation will be construed like other
contracts," the parties' intentions must be determined solely from the language of the [stipulation]
unless the language of the stipulation is ambiguous. Patton v. Patton, 2003 Ut App 184; (quoting
Yeargin, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Comm % 2001 Ut 11, f 39, 20 P.3d
287.) As such, "A contract is ambiguous only if the words.. .may be understood to reach two or
more possible meanings... If the contract provisions above are ambiguous, then relevant extrinsic
evidence, including parol evidence, can be admitted to determine the parties' intent." Aspenwood
v. CAT., 2003 Ut App 28, 73 P.3d 947, 954. Seemingly then, the Court in its own judgment
opined that f5 was ambiguous and properly took extrinsic evidence to decipher the meaning.
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Essentially, the Appellant is objecting to the interpretation of f 5 that the Court reached,
more so than he has any basis for the objection. The Court did not decide that an automatic
reduction or any modification was proper. Instead, the Court heard extrinsic testimony from both
parties on the meaning of f5 and found that the intent of the f5 was to grant to the Appellee a
right to "receive the sum of $831 per month until the youngest child of the parties reaches 18 or
her normal class graduates from high school." (R739 at f4). In reality this is the end of the
discussion regairding the stipulated order because the remainder of the Court's findings as to child
support are result oriented. To explain, once the Court found as it did, that the meaning of f5 was
to entitle the Appellee to continuing and unmodified child support until the time the youngest
child turns 18, the child support order deviated from the guidelines in amount and duration and
fell into the exception of UCA 78-45-7.10(3) wherein a deviated order is not subject to automatic
adjustment and outside the confines of and ruling set forth in Johansen v. Johansen. Conclusively
then, the Appellant's issue as to the award of child support does not amount to an error at law
based upon what the Court actually did, what it found and how it concluded which is obviously in
striking contrast to what the Appellant would have apparently liked the Court to have done.
In addition, the Appellee sets forth here that the Court's decision to deviate from the
guidelines and allow the support to continue beyond the eldest child turning 18 is entirely proper.
"The courts can also enforce an agreement by the parties in a divorce action to continue support
beyond that allowed by statutory law." Johansen v. Johansen, 2002 Ut App 75,45 P.3d 520 ^[18.
(citing also Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1981) and Balls v. Hackley, 745 P.2d
836, 837-38 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (affimiing trial court's enforcement of parties' stipulation that
child support would continue after eighteen years under specified circumstances.) Therefore, the
Appellee prays that this court find that the Court acted properly and did not error or abuse its
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discretion byfindingthe stipulated order ambiguous, taking extrinsic evidence, andfindingthat
the child support deviatedfromthe guidelines.
B.

THE EXISTENCE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGREEMENT

THAT FORMED THE BASIS FOR THE AMENDED ORDER ON STIPULATION NEED
NOT BE AFFIRMATIVELY DEFENDED AS IT DOES NOT QUALIFY AS AN
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND WAS PROPERLY SET FORTH IN THE APPELLEE'S
ANSWER AS A DENIAL.
Appellant claims that he was the victim of an "ambush" because he was not properly
notified through an Affirmative Defense set forth in the Answer to Petition to Modify, that the
Appellee understood that the agreement that formed the Amended Order on Stipulation allowed
for child support to continue unmodified until the last child turned 18 in consideration for
Appellee waiver and satisfaction of numerous claims R807 (44-50. "Unless a matter be
affirmatively pleaded as a defense under rule 8(c), a defendant can merely deny the plaintiffs
averments under rule 8 (b)." Prince v. Bear River Mutual Insurance Co., 2002 UT 68, 56 P.3d
5^4, 534; citing Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366, 1374 (Utah
1996). "The purpose of requiring a party to plead affirmative defenses under rule 8 (c) is to
ensure that parties 'have adequate notice of the issues and facts in the case.'" Prince v. Bear
Mutual Insurance Co. at 534 citing in part Price -Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell,
Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986). "In other words, if a defense directly assails or 'merely
controverts [a] plaintiffs prima facie case,' it is not an affirmative defense and can be simply
denied under rule 8 (b)." Prince at 534; citing Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 923 P.2d
at 137.

In application here, the Appellee argues that she need not set forth the agreement as an
affirmative defense and properly denied the same because it directly controverted the Appellant's
Petition to Modify and did not fall outside those matters plead. Appellant's Verified Petition to
Modify states in f3(b) that the supplemental decree does not clearly set forth that child support
shall cease for each child. (See R595 f3(b)) In response, Appellee answered the Petition by stating
in % 1 of the Answer that any supplemental orders speak for themselves. (R623 at f 1). An
affirmative defense is not necessary in the Answer as the Appellee stated that documents speak for
themselves and denied directly anything else contained in the allegations. In other words, at the
time the answer was given until such time as the Court changed the meaning of the child support
obligation, the Appellee admitted the document spoke for itself and that it stated that which she
clearly understood to be that the child support would continue unabated to compensate her for
waiving arrears.
Additionally, Appellee argues that the only defense available should be that of estopping
the Appellant from claiming the Appellee failed to set forth a defense. As this Court can clearly
find from the record (R807 at pgs. 38-46 and 81-84), the parties apparently interpreted the child
support provision division and in accordance to their respective understandings of the agreement.
These respective understandings were proper both at the time it was plead and answered. The
decree in which Appellant was petitioning to modify was clear to both parties apparently. Just
because they differed in interpretation did not mean that the matter fell outside the pleading.
Appellee denied everything else and Appellant has no basis to say then or now that the document
had only one possible interpretation. Certainly he knew that Appellee differed based upon her
denial and even more so, based upon the fact that the Court had to rule upon the meaning and
intent of the child support language. This issue is neither one of accord and satisfaction nor is it
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one of estoppel or any other extrinsic defense. This issue is one of differing interpretations of
language within a document that was properly set forth by the Appellant in his Petition and
properly conceded to by the Appellee in her Answer.
C

IT WOULD BE IMPROPER FOR THE COURT TO ALLOW THE

APPELLANT THE CHILD FOR TAX PURPOSES AS THAT ISSUE WAS NEVER
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT AND WOULD BE A MODIFICATION OF A
DECREE PREVIOUSLY AND SEPARATELY ENTERED BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
On or about the 2nd day of January, 1992, the Third Judicial District Court entered a
Decree of Divorce between the Appellant and the Appellee, case number 914902600, of which is
hereto attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. Said Decree in paragraph 14
clearly states: "That plaintiff be and is hereby awarded the right to claim the parties' three minor
children as dependents for income tax purposes." The Supplemental Decree of Divorce entered
into between the parties in 1997 makes fiirther reference to said 1992 Decree. Paragraph 1 of the
1997 Decree states "That all of the terms and provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered into by
and between the parties by the Honorable Richard H. Moffat on approximately the 2nd of January,
1992 in the above-entitled Court in Civil No. 914902600 shall remain in foil force and effect
unless amended or modified by this Supplemental Decree of Divorce." (R209 at f 1). Clearly, the
Supplemental Decree states not only that the previous Decree shall remain in force but does not
specifically incorporate anything from that Decree to the subsequent action. As such, the 1997
Supplemental Decree does not modify or change in any way the provision within the 1992 Decree
whereby the Appellee was awarded the use of the minor children for tax purposes. Appellee
therefore has a definitive right to claim the children that has not been relinquished or changed by
Court Order. In fact, nothing is properly before the Court now that can modify the 1992 Decree.
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True the Appellant sets forth in his Petition to Modify (R595 at %5) that he should be entitled to
use the minor child for tax purposes, but the Appellant asked for something that should have been
asked for in a different case. As such, the Court cannot rule upon the Appellant's request for the
tax exemption as the Court has not been petitioned nor has a change of circumstances been
alleged or shown within the action that first and still does grant the Appellee the right to claim the
children as dependents for tax purposes.
Additionally, even if the Court were able to rule on the tax exemption issue, the same is
not vested with the Appellant. Utah Code §78-45-7.21(1) states specifically, that "No
presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the right to claim a child or children as
exemptions for federal and state income tax purposes. Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in
writing, the court or administrative agency shall award in any final order the exemption on a caseby-case basis." There was in this case, testimony by the Appellee on the tax exemption issue.
(R807 at pgs. 74-75). Appellee states in her testimony essentially that she still incurs an expense
on behalf of the minor child and that the exemption will certainly result in a benefit for her. As
such, notwithstanding the inability of the Court to rule on this issue or the changes in
circumstance never set forth, evidence has been presented that validates the Appellee's claim for
the exemption and in reality is proper here in consideration of the Utah Code above and the lack
of presumption to award said exemptions to any one party.
D.

IF ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE AWARDED APPELLEE SHOULD

RECEIVE THE SAME.
As stated in the Amended Order on Stipulation ( R508 at f 12) the Court had the discretion to
award attorney's fees to the prevailing party. The Appellee was the prevailing party in regard to
the Appellant's Petitioner for Modification. Therefore, the Appellee should have been awarded
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attorney's fees. However, the Court found that the Petition to Modify was not brought in bad
faith and there was a legitimate dispute as to the interpretation of f5 of said order and therefore
the Court ordered both parties to pay their own attorney's fees and costs incurred. Appellant's
request for attorney's fees appears to be based upon assumption that the above Court should rule
that Appellant should have prevailed at the trial in the lower Court. However, as stated, the
Appellant did not prevail and therefore, no attorney's fees should be awarded since none were
awarded to either party in the lower Court.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing and specifically based upon the clear support of the record, the
Appellee respectfully requests that this Courtfindand rule that the Trial Court did not abuse its
discretion or make any errors of law regarding the issues set forth above and that the Trial
Court's decision in this matter be affirmed accordingly.

Respectfully submitted this the 7-tf* day of

Xf^j^S^

, 2000.

^Richard S. Nemelka
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served by United States Mail, postage prepaid, two cbpies of the
foregoing Brief of the Appellee to Randy S. Ludlow, Attorney for the Respondent/Appellant, 185
South State Street, Suite 208, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this the J fi* day of
^-J(A/MXC~,

2004.
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBITS
A.

Decree of Divorce entered January 2,1992.

EXHIBIT A

IX

f
JAW - 1 1991

v i a
R I C H A R D S. N E M E L K A
ATTORNEY AT LAW

no.

r

2396

2046 EAST 4800 SOUTH
SUITE 103
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84117
(801)272-4244

Attorney for

Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JULIE D. BLAIN,
Plaintiff,
V •

,
)

anioas

l-T^a-s^Wv,.

DECREE OF DIVORCE

j

DENNIS D. BLAIN,
Defendant.

Civil No. 914902600 DA
Judge Richard H. Moffat

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat of the above-entitled
Court on the 16th day of December, 1991 plaintiff being present
and being represented by her attorney, Richard S. Kemelka. and
defendant being present and being represented by his attorney,
Cheryl Jolley, and a Stipulation having been read into the
record and the parties having agreed to the same and the

defendant having agreed to have his Answer withdrawn and his
default entered and the default of the defendant having been
entered and evidence on part of the plaintiff having been
introduced, the Court being fully advised in the premises and
the Court having heretofore made and entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law; therefore, upon motion of Richard
S. Nenelka, Attorney for Plaintiff
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AMD DECREED as follows:
1.

That the bonds of matrimony heretofore and now

existing between the plaintiff and defendant are hereby dissolved
j and the plaintiff is qranted a decree of divorce from the
defendant the same to become absolute and final upon the filincr
of the same with the Salt Lake County Clerk, State of Utah,
2.

That plaintiff be and is hereby awarded the care,

custody and control of the minor children of the parties, to-wit:
Douglas, age 10; Christopher, age 7; and Chelsea, age 2.
Defendant be and is hereby awarded reasonable rights of
visitation as specified in the visitation schedule attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference.
3.

That plaintiff be and is hereby av/arded and defendant

be and is hereby ordered to pay child support in the sum of
Five Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars ($58 3.00) per month for
said minor children to begin in the month of December, 1991.
4.

That defendant be and is hereby ordered to pay to the

plaintiff one-half (1/2) of all child care costs incurred bv the

5.

That plaintiff be and is hereby awarded permanent

alimony in the sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per month
to begin in the month of December, 1991.
6.

That the support and alimony payments shall be paid

one-half (1/2) by the 5th and one-half (1/2) by the 20th of
the month.
7.

That the plaintiff be and is hereby awarded all of the

parties' rights, title and interest in and to the home and
residence located at 8657 Piper Lane, Sandy, Utah, and the
defendant be and is hereby ordered to forthwith sign and execute
a Quit-Claim Deed deeding to the plaintiff all of his rights,
title and interest in and to said property.
8.

That the defendant be and is hereby awarded all of the

parties rights, title and interest in and to the defendant's
401 K retirement plan.
9.

That each party be and is hereby awarded all of the

personal property presently in that parties1 possession except
that the defendant be and is hereby awarded his power tools that
are in the possession of the plaintiff.
10.

That defendant be and is hereby ordered to assume and

pay all the debts and obligations incurred during the marriage
and indemnify the plaintiff and hold her harmless therefrom.

3

11.

Tha- the defendant be and i s hereby ordered to

maintain a policy of h e a l t h , accident, h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n and
dental insurance

for the benefit of the p a r t i e s 1 minor children

and each party be and i s hereby ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of
a l l medical, dental, orthodontic, o p t i c a l and t h e r a p e u t i c
expenses incurred not covered by insurance.
12.

That the defendant be and i s hereby ordered to

maintain h i s current l i f e insurance and name the minor children
as irrevocable b e n e f i c i a r i e s thereon u n t i l such time t h a t they
reach the age of majority or emancipation, whichever occurs
first.
13.

That each p a r t y be and i s hereby ordered to pay t h e i r

own a t t o r n e y ' s fees and c o s t s .
14.

That p l a i n t i f f be and i s hereby awarded the r i g h t to

claim the p a r t i e s ' three minor children as dependents for income
tax purposes,
DATED this

'T'

day of
BY

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
CHERYL JOLLEY

